Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/395

IX] Indeterminate and Deterl1zinate P ereeption 379 impositions. But both Kumarila and Prabhakara think that both the genus and the differentia are perceived in the indeterminate stage, but these do not manifest themselves to us only because we do not remember the other things in relation to which, or in contrast to which, the percept has to show its character as genus or differentia; a thing can be cognized as an "individual" only in comparison with other things from which it differs in certain well- defined characters; and it can be apprehended as belonging to a class only when it is found to possess certain characteristic features in common with some other things; so we see that as other things are not presented to consciousness through memory, the percept at the indeterminate stage cannot be fully apprehended as an individual belonging to a class, though the data constituting the characteristic of the thing as a genus and its differentia are per- ceived at the indeterminate stage 1. So long as other things are not remembered these data cannot manifest themselves properly, and hence the perception of the thing remains indeterminate at the first stage of perception. At the second stage the self by its past im- pressions brings the present perception in relation to past ones and realizes its character as involving universal and particular. It is thus apparent that the difference between the indeterminate and the determinate perception is this, that in the latter case memory of other things creeps in, but this association of memory in the determinate perception refers to those other objects of . memory and not to the percept. It is also held that though the determinate perception is based upon the indeterminate one, yet since the former also apprehends certain such factors as did not enter into the indeterminate perception, it is to be regarded as a valid cognition. Kumarila also agrees with Prabhakara in holding both the indeterminate and the determinate perception valid 2. Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of Perception. The perception of the class (jiiti) of a percept in relation to other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The pro- blems of jati and avayavavayavl (part and whole notion) were 1 Compare this with the Vaiseika view as interpreted by Sridhara. 2 See Prakara,!apaficikii and astradipikii.