Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/396

3 80 Mimii1!zsa Philosophy [CH. the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before enter- ing into discussion about jati, Prabhakara first introduced the problem of avayava (part) and avayavi (whole). He argues as an exponent of svataJ::l-pramaIfyavada that the proof of the true existence of anything must ultimately rest on our own con- sciousness, and what is distinctly recognized in consciousness must be admitted to have its existence established. Following this canon Prabhakara says that gross objects as a whole exist, since they are so perceived. The subtle atoms are the material cause and their con nection (sattzyoga) is the immaterial cause (aSa11zavilyikiirala), and it is the latter which renders the whole altogether different from the parts of which it is composed; and it is not necessary that all the parts should be perceived before the whole is perceived. Kumarila holds that it is due to the point of view from which we look at a thing that we call it a separate whole or only a conglomeration of parts. In reality they are iden- tical, but when we lay stress on the notion of parts, the thing appears to be a conglomeration of them, and when we look at it from the point of view of the unity appearing as a whole, the thing appears to be a whole of which there are parts (see Slokaviirttika, Vanaviida) 1. Jati, though incorporating the idea of having many units within one, is different from the conception of whole in this, that it resides in its entirety in each individual constituting that jati (vyiisajya- 1 According to Siilpkhya- Yoga a thing is regarded as the unity of the universal and the particular (siilllii1Zyavife!asallludiiyo dravyalll, Vyiisabhii!ya, III. 44); for there is no other separate entity which is different from them both in which they would inhere as Nyaya holds. Conglomerations can be of two kinds, namely those in which the parts exist at a distance from one another (e.g. a forest), and those in which they exist close to- gether (nirantarii hi tadavayavii!.z), and it is this latter combination (ayutasiddhiivayava) which is called a dravya, but here also there is no separate whole distinct from the parts; it is the parts connected in a particular way and having no perceptible space between them that is called a thing or a whole. The Buddhists as Pal)ditasoka has shown did not believe in any whole (avayavJ); it is the atoms which in connection with one another appeared as a whole occupying space (paramlizava eva hi pararupadefapari- hiirelotpa1Z1liil; parasparasahitti avabhiisalJllinii defavitii1Zava1Zto bhavanti). The whole is thus a mere appearance and not a reality (see Avayaviniriikarala, Six Buddhist Nyiiya Tracts). Nyiiya however held that the atoms were part less (lliravayava) and hence it would be wrong to say that when we see an object we see the atoms. The existence of a whole as diffcrent from the parts which belong to it is directly experienced and there is no valid reason against it : ., aduf!akaralodbhuta1Jla1tiivil'bhut abiidhakam asalldigdalica vijliiinam katham mithyeti kathyate." Nyii)'amalijari, pp. 550 fr.