Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/406

390 Ml77zii7!zsii Philosophy [CH. relation between two concrete things, as in the case of smoke and fire, has been noticed. The latter is that kind of inference where the permanent relation is observed not between two concrete things but between two general notions, as in the case of move- ment and change of place, e.g. the perceived cases where there is change of place there is also motion involved with it; so from the change of place of the sun its motion is inferred and it is held that this general notion is directly perceived like all universals I. Prabhakara recognizes the need of forming the notion of the permanent relation, but he does not lay any stress on the fact that this permanent relation between two things (fire and smoke) is taken in connection with a third thing in which they both subsist. He says that the notion of the permanent relation be- tween two things is the main point, whereas in all other associa- tions of time and place the things in which these two subsist together are taken only as adjuncts to qualify the two things (e.g. fire and smoke). I t is also necessary to recognize the fact tha t though the concomitance of smoke in fire is only conditional, the concomitance of the fire in smoke is unconditional and abso- lute 2 . Vhen such a conviction is firmly rooted in the mind that the concept of the presence of smoke involves the concept of the presence of fire, the inference of fire is made as soon as any smoke is seen. Prabhakara counts separately the fallacies of the minor (pakiibhiisa), of the enunciation (pratijiiablzasa) and of the example (d!'!antablliisa) along with the fallacies of the middle and this seems to indicate that the MlmaIpsa logic was not alto- gether free from Buddhist influence. The cognition of smoke includes within itself the cognition of fire also, and thus there would be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the inferential cognition. But this objection has little force with Prabhakara, for he does not admit that a pramarya should necessarily bring us any new knowledge, for pramarya is simply defined as" appre- hension." So though the inferential cognition always pertains to things already known it is yet regarded by him as a prama1)a, since it is in any case no doubt an apprehension. 1 See 'slokaviirttika, NJ"lyaratlliikara, &lstradipiJ,:li, YuktisnehaPltra1Ji, Siddhiln- tacalldrikii on anumana. 2 On the subject of the means of assuring oneself that there is no condition (uPiidhi) which may vitiate the inference, Prabhakara has nothing new to tell us. He says that where even after careful enquiry in a large number of cases the condition cannot he discovered we must say that it does not exist (praYlltllmallviiya1lliize allfiidhikatvii- llavaga1lliit, see Frakarazapaiicikli, p. 7 I).