Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/407

IX] Upanzii1za and A rthapatti 39 1 U pamana, Arthapatti. Analogy (upamana) is accepted by Mlmaq1sa in a sense which is different from that in which N yaya took it. The man who has seen a cow (go) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox (gavaya) , and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya with the go, and then cognizes the similarity of the go (which is not within the limits of his perception then) with the gavaya. The cognition of this similarity of the gavaya in the go, as it follows directly from the perception of the similarity of the go in the gavaya, is called upamana (analogy). It is regarded as a sepa- rate pramaa, because by it we can apprehend the similarity existing in a thing which is not perceived at the moment. It is not mer remembrance, for at the time the go was seen the gavaya was not seen, and hence the similarity also was not seen, and what was not seen could not be remembered. The difference of Prabhakara and Kumarila on this point is that while the latter regards similarity as only a quality consisting in the fact of more than one object having the same set of qualities, the former regards it as a distinct category. Arthiipatti (implication) is a new prama1)a which is admitted by the Mlmaq1sa. Thus when we know that a person Devadatta is alive and perceive that he is not in the house, we cannot re- concile these two facts, viz. his remaining alive and his not being in the house without presuming his existence somewhere outside the house, and this method of cognizing the existence of Deva- datta outside the house is called arthiiPatti (presumption or implication ). The exact psychological analysis of the mind in this artha- patti cognition is a matter on which Prabhakara and Kumarila disagree. Prabhakara holds that when a man knows that Deva- datta habitually resides in his house but yet does not find him there, his knowledge that Devadatta is living (though acquired previously by some other means of proof) is made doubtful, and the cause of this doubt is that he does not find Devadatta at his house. The absence of Devadatta from the house is not the cause of implication, but it throws into doubt the very existence of Deva- datta, and thus forces us to imagine that Devadatta must remain somewhere outside. That can only be found by implication, without the hypothesis of which the doubt cannot be removed. The mere absence of Devadatta from the house is not enough for