directly dependent upon them for support, it will be more watchful and cautious in the imposition of taxes, than a body, which emanates exclusively from the states in their sovereign political capacity.[1] But, as the senators are in a just sense equally representatives of the people, and do not hold their offices by a permanent or hereditary tide, but periodically return to the common mass of citizens;[2] and above all, as direct taxes are, and must be, apportioned among the states according to their federal population; and as all the states have a distinct local interest, both as to the amount and nature of all taxes of every sort, which are to be levied, there seems a peculiar fitness in giving to the senate a power to alter and amend, as well as to concur with, or reject all money bills. The due influence of all the states is thus preserved; for otherwise it might happen, from the overwhelming representation of some of the large states, that taxes might be levied, which would bear with peculiar severity upon the interests, either agricultural, commercial, or manufacturing, of others being the minor states; and thus the equilibrium intended by the constitution, as well of power, as of interest, and influence, might be practically subverted.
§ 874. There would also be no small inconvenience in excluding the senate from the exercise of this power of amendment and alteration; since if any, the slightest modification were required in such a bill to make it either palatable or just, the senate would be compelled to reject it, although an amendment of a single linePage:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/349
CH. XIII.]
MODE OF PASSING LAWS.
341
