in the shape of a multitude of individual cases, but few of which the President will be able to examine himself. A very large number of them, especially in the Post-Office Department, do not come before him at all. In most of the cases which do come before him, he will have to trust the heads of the respective Departments for the information on which he is to act, for the reasons why this man should be removed and the other man should be appointed, while he himself has to bear the responsibility. Now, my experience is that the great danger of a reform Administration consists in the inclination of those engaged in it to admit exceptions to their rules. As soon as this is done every case will be represented as an exceptional one upon all sorts of plausible pretexts; that by this removal or that appointment the party will be greatly strengthened in this or that locality, or the favor of this or that powerful interest can be propitiated, etc., etc. As these exceptions accumulate, the character and credit of the Administration go down and down until finally there is little left but the original good intentions.
In one word, if you want to have a reform Administration, you must have, at least at the head of the three great “patronage” Departments, the Treasury, the Post-Office and the Interior, men who understand reform as you do, who believe in it as you do, who are willing to fight for it as you are and who will not be swerved from their purpose by any political seduction, even if they should be prospective candidates for the Presidency—the severest trial to which the political virtue of a public man can be exposed. At least they should not be much below this standard; for if your Department-Chiefs look upon your reform policy as a mere amiable hobby to be humored for a while, and if they say to the politicians wanting patronage: “We should be glad to accommodate you, but you know the President has some singular notions in his head,
