and you must be patient”—your reform policy is doomed. You must be able absolutely to depend upon them as to their governing motives as well as their ability practically to deal with such things, and this requirement is most imperative just at the start, for then the pressure and the struggle will be severest and the character of your Administration will then virtually be determined.
On this point I cannot express myself too strongly, for I know from experience what I am speaking of. Neither will this matter admit of much experimenting. If you make any serious mistake in your first choice for the Cabinet, the consequences will make themselves felt immediately, for the call for decisive action is upon you at the very beginning. And, moreover, you will not find it as easy as might be imagined to get rid of a man who is once in your Cabinet.
There is another general point of view which I would commend to your consideration. It can hardly be expected that the starting of a new Administration should pass off entirely without accidental blunders. They will not hurt you much if you have the confidence of the country to such an extent that an occasional mistake will be ascribed to accident rather than to questionable motives. It must not be forgotten that you are a comparatively new man on the National field, not yet as well known and as confidentially trusted elsewhere as you are in this State. In this respect the impression produced by the general character of your Cabinet will be of great importance to you. It may win and strengthen confidence, or it may start suspicion and distrust. Your party, too, makes a sort of first appearance in the National Executive. Much depends upon the manner of that appearance. Your Cabinet will be its first introduction. Under such circumstances, it seems to me, you should have in that Cabinet only men well known to the American people,
