The Works of the Rev. Jonathan Swift/Volume 2/A Discourse of the Contests and Dissensions between the Nobles and the Commons in Athens and Rome/Chapter 1
A DISCOURSE, &c.
CHAP. I.
IT is agreed, that in all government there is an absolute unlimited power, which naturally and originally seems to be placed in the whole body, whereever the executive part of it lies. This holds in the body natural; for wherever we place the beginning of motion, whether from the head, or the heart, or the animal spirits in general, the body moves and acts by a consent of all its parts. This unlimited power, placed fundamentally in the body of a people, is what the best legislators of all ages have endeavoured, in their several schemes or institutions of government, to deposite in such hands as would preserve the people from rapine and oppression within, as well as violence from without. Most of them seem to agree in this, that it was a trust too great to be committed to any one man or assembly, and therefore they left the right still in the whole body; but the administration or executive part, in the hands of the one, the few, or the many; into which three powers all independent bodies of men seem naturally to divide: for, by all I have read of those innumerable and petty commonwealths in Italy, Greece, and Sicily, as well as the great ones of Carthage and Rome, it seems to me, that a free people met together, whether by compact, or family-government, as soon as they fall into any acts of civil society, do of themselves divide into three powers. The first, is that of some one eminent spirit, who, having signalized his valour and fortune in defence of his country, or by the practice of popular arts at home, comes to have great influence on the people, to grow their leader in warlike expeditions, and to preside, after a sort. In their civil assemblies; and this is grounded upon the principles of nature and common reason, which in all difficulties or dangers, where prudence or courage is required, rather incite us to fly for counsel or assistance to a single person, than a multitude. The second natural division of power is, of such men, who have acquired large possessions, and consequently dependencies, or descend from ancestors who have left them great inheritances, together with an hereditary authority. These easily uniting in thoughts and opinions, and acting in concert, begin to enter upon measures for securing their properties, which are best upheld by preparing against invasions from abroad, and maintaining peace at home; this commences a great council, or senate of nobles, for the weighty affairs of the nation. The last division is, of the mass or body of the people, whose part of power is great and indisputible, whenever they can unite either collectively, or by deputation, to exert it. Now the three forms of government, so generally known in the schools, differ only by the civil administration being placed[1] in the hands of one, or sometimes two, (as in Sparta) who were called kings; or in a senate, who were called the nobles; or in the people collective or representative, who may be called the commons. Each of these had frequently the executive power in Greece, and sometimes in Rome: but the power in the last resort, was always meant by legislators, to be held in balance among all three. And it will be an eternal rule in politicks among every free people, that there is a balance of power to be carefully held by every state within itself, as well as among several states with each other.
The true meaning of a balance of power, either without or within a state, is best conceived by considering, what the nature of a balance is. It supposes three things; First, the part which is held, together with the hand that holds it; and then the two scales, with whatever is weighed therein. Now consider several states in a neighbourhood; in order to preserve peace between these states, it is necessary they should be formed into a balance, whereof one or more are to be directors, who are to divide the rest into equal scales, and upon occasion remove from one into the other, or else fall with their own weight into the lightest: so in a state within itself, the balance must be held by a third hand, who is to deal the remaining power with the utmost exactness into the several scales. Now it is not necessary that the power should be equally divided between these three; for the balance may be held by the weakest, who, by his address and conduct, removing from either scale, and adding of his own, may keep the scales duly poised. Such was that of the two kings of Sparta, the consular power in Rome, that of the kings of Media before the reign of Cyrus, as represented by Xenophon: and that of the several limited states in the Gothick institution.
When the balance is broken, whether by the negligence, folly, or weakness of the hand that held it, or by mighty weights fallen into either scale, the power will never continue long in equal division between the two remaining parties, but, till the balance is fixed anew, will run entirely into one. This gives the truest account of what is understood in the most ancient and approved Greek authors, by the word Tyranny; which is not meant for the seizing of the uncontrolled or absolute power into the hands of a single person, (as many superficial men have grossly mistaken) but for the breaking of the balance by whatever hand, and leaving the power wholly in one scale: For, tyranny and usurpation in a state are by no means confined to any number, as might easily appear from examples enough; and because the point is material, I shall cite a few to prove it.
The Romans[2], having sent to Athens, and the Greek cities of Italy, for the copies of the best laws, chose ten legislators to put them into form, and during the exercise of their office, suspended the consular power, leaving the administration of affairs in their hands. These very men, though chosen for such a work, as the digesting a body of laws for the government of a free state, did immediately usurp arbitrary power, ran into all the forms of it, had their guards and spies after the practice of the tyrants of those ages, affected kingly state, destroyed the nobles, and oppressed the people; one of them proceeding so far, as to endeavour to force a lady of great virtue: the very crime which gave occasion to the expulsion of the regal power but sixty years before, as this attempt did to that of the Decemviri.
The Ephori in Sparta, were at first only certain persons deputed by the kings to judge in civil matters, while they were employed in the wars. These men, at several times, usurped the absolute authority, and were as cruel tyrants, as any in their age.
Soon after the unfortunate expedition into Sicily[3], the Athenians chose four hundred men for administration of affairs, who became a body of tyrants, and were called, in the language of those ages, an oligarchy, or tyranny of the few; under which hateful denomination they were soon after deposed in great rage by the people.
When Athens was subdued by Lysander[4], he appointed thirty men for the administration of that city, who immediately fell into the rankest tyrranny: but this was not all; for, conceiving their power not founded on a basis large enough, they admitted three thousand into a share of the government; and thus fortified, became the cruellest tyranny upon record. They murdered in cold blood great numbers of the best men, without any provocation, from the mere lust of cruelty, like Nero or Caligula. This was such a number of tyrants together, as amounted to near a third part of the whole city; for Xenophon tells us[5], that the city contained about ten thousand houses; and allowing one man to every house, who could have any share in the government, (the rest consisting of women, children, and servants) and making other obvious abatements, these tyrants, if they had been careful to adhere together, might have been a majority even of the people collective.
In the time of the second Punick war[6], the balance of power in Carthage was got on the side of the people; and this to a degree, that some authors reckon the government to have been then among them a dominatio plebis, or tyranny of the commons; which it seems they were at all times apt to fall into, and was at last among the causes, that ruined their state: and the frequent murders of their generals, which Diodorus[7] tells us was grown to an established custom among them, may be another instance, that tyranny is not confined to numbers.
I shall mention but one example more among a great number, that might be produced; it is related by the author last cited[8]. The orators of the people at Argos (whether you will style them in modern phrase, great speakers of the house; or only, in general, representatives of the people collective) stirred up the commons against the nobles, of whom 1600 were murdered at once; and at last, the orators themselves, because they left off their accusations, or, to speak intelligibly, because they withdrew their impeachments; having, it seems, raised a spirit they were not able to lay. And this last circumstance, as cases have lately stood, may perhaps be worth noting.
From what has been already advanced, several conclusions may be drawn:
First, That a mixed government, partaking of the known forms received in the schools, is by no means of Gothick invention, but has place in nature and reason, seems very well to agree with the sentiments of most legislators, and to have been followed in most states, whether they have appeared under the name of monarchies, aristocracies, or democracies: for, not to mention the several republicks of this composition in Gaul and Germany, described by Cæsar and Tacitus, Polybius tells us, the best government is that, which consists of three forms, regis, optimatium, & populi imperio[9], which may be fairly translated, the king, lords, and commons. Such was that of Sparta, in its primitive institution by Lycurgus; who, observing the corruptions and depravations to which every of these was subject, compounded his scheme out of all; so that it was made up of reges, seniores, & populus. Such also was the state of Rome under its consuls: and the author tells us, that the Romans fell upon this model purely by chance, (which I take to have been nature and common reason) but the Spartans, by thought and design. And such at Carthage was the summa reipublicæ[10], or power in the last resort; for they had their kings called sufferes, and a senate which had the power of nobles, and the people had a share established too.
Secondly, It will follow, That those reasoners, who employ so much of their zeal, their wit, and their leisure for the upholding the balance of power in Christendom, at the same time that by their practices they are endeavouring to destroy it at home, are not such mighty patriots, or so much in the true interest of their country, as they would aifect to be thought; but seem to be employed like a man, who pulls down with his right hand, what he has been building with his left.
Thirdly, This makes appear the errour of those, who think it an uncontrollable maxim, that power is always safer lodged in many hands, than in one: for, if these many hands be made up only from one of the three divisions before-mentioned, it is plain from those examples already produced, and easy to be paralleled in other ages and countries, that they are capable of enslaving the nation, and of acting all manner of tyranny and oppression, as it is possible for a single person to be, though we should suppose their number not only to be of four or five hundred, but above three thousand.
Again, It is manifest from what has been said, that in order to preserve the balance in a mixed state, the limits of power deposited with each party ought to be ascertained, and generally known. The defect of this, is the cause that introduces those strugglings in a state about prerogative and liberty, about encroachments of the few upon the rights of the many, and of the many upon the privileges of the few, which ever did, and ever will conclude in a tyranny; first, either of the few, or the many; but at last, infallibly of a single person: for, whichever of the three divisions in a state is upon the scramble for more power than its own, (as one or other of them generally is) unless due care be taken by the other two, upon every new question that arises, they will be sure to decide in favour of themselves, talk much of inherent right; they will nourish up a dormant power, and reserve privileges in petto, to exert upon occasions, to serve expedients, and to urge upon necessities; they will make large demands, and scanty concessions, ever coming off considerable gainers: thus at length the balance is broke, and tyranny let in; from which door of the three it matters not.
To pretend to a declarative right upon any occasion whatsoever, is little less than to make use of the whole power; that is, to declare an opinion to be law, which has always been contested, or perhaps never started at all before such an incident brought it on the stage. Not to consent to the enacting of such a law, which has no view beside the general good, unless another law shall at the same time pass, with no other view but that of advancing the power of one party alone; what is this but to claim a positive voice, as well as a negative[11]? To pretend that great changes and alienations of property have created new and great dependencies, and consequently new additions of power, as some reasoners have done, is a most dangerous tenet. If dominion must follow property, let it follow in the same pace; for, change in property through the bulk of a nation makes slow marches, and its due power always attends it. To conclude that whatever attempt is begun by an assembly, ought to be pursued to the end, without regard to the greatest incidents that may happen to alter the case; to count it mean, and below the dignity of a house, to quit a prosecution; to resolve upon a conclusion before it is possible to be apprised of the premises; to act thus, I say, is to affect not only absolute power, but infallibility too. Yet such unaccountable proceedings as these have popular assemblies engaged in, for want of fixing the due limits of power and privilege.
Great changes may indeed be made in a government, yet the form continue, and the balance be held: but large intervals of time must pass between every such innovation, enough to melt down and make it of a piece with the constitution. Such, we are told, were the proceedings of Solon, when he modelled anew the Athenian commonwealth; and what convulsions in our own, as well as other states, have been bred by a neglect of this rule, is fresh and notorious enough: it is too soon in all conscience to repeat this errour again.
Having shown, that there is a natural balance of power in all free states, and how it has been divided, sometimes by the people themselves, as in Rome; at others by the institutions of the legislators, as in the several states of Greece and Sicily; the next thing is, to examine what methods have been taken to break or overthrow this balance, which every one of the three parties has continually endeavoured, as opportunities have served[12]; as might appear from the stories of most ages and countries: for, absolute power in a particular state, is of the same nature with universal monarchy in several states adjoining to each other. So endless and exorbitant are the desires of men, whether considered in their persons or their states, that they will grasp at all, and can form no scheme of perfect happiness with less. Ever since men have been united into governments, the hopes and endeavours after universal monarchy have been bandied among them, from the reign of Ninus, to this of the most christian king; in which pursuits, commonwealths have had their share, as well as monarchs: so the Athenians, the Spartans, the Thebans, and the Achaians, did several times aim at the universal monarchy of Greece: so the commonwealths of Carthage and Rome, affected the universal monarchy of the then known world. In like manner has absolute power been pursued by the several parties of each particular state; wherein single persons have met with most success, though the endeavours of the few and the many have been frequent enough: yet, being neither so uniform in their designs, nor so direct in their views, they neither could manage nor maintain the power they had got; but were ever deceived by the popularity and ambition of some single person. So that it will be always a wrong step in policy, for the nobles or commons to carry their endeavours after power so far, as to overthrow the balance: and it would be enough to damp their warmth in such pursuits, if they could once reflect, that in such a course they will be sure to run upon the very rock, that they meant to avoid; which, I suppose they would have us think is the tyranny, of a single person.
Many examples might be produced of the endeavours of each of these three rivals after absolute power; but I shall suit my discourse to the time I am writing in, and relate only such dissentions in Greece and Rome, between the nobles and commons, with the consequences of them, wherein the latter were the aggressors.
I shall begin with Greece, where my observation shall be confined to Athens, though several instances might be brought from other states thereof.
- ↑ It should be, 'by the civil administration's being placed,' &c.
- ↑ Dionys. Hal. lib. 10.
- ↑ Thucyd. lib. 8.
- ↑ Xenoph. de Rebus Græc. l. 2.
- ↑ Memorab. lib. 3.
- ↑ Polyb. Frag. lib. 6.
- ↑ Lib. 20.
- ↑ Lib. 15.
- ↑ Fragm. lib. 6.
- ↑ Id. ib.
- ↑ This seems to allude to a practice of the House of Commons called Tacking; when they suspected that a favourite bill would be rejected, they tacked it to a money-bill; and as it was not possible to proceed without the supply, and as it became necessary to reject or receive both the bills thus tacked together, this expedient perfectly answered its purpose.
- ↑ 'As opportunities have served; as might appear,' &c. The repetition of the particle, as, at the beginning of two members of a sentence so near each other, has a bad effect. The former might be changed to 'whenever' 'whenever opportunities offered; as might appear,' &c.